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Criminal Securities Fraud and the Lower 
Materiality Standard 
By Wendy Gerwick Couture1 
I. Introduction 
Securities fraud has been a federal crime since the enactment of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, prohibit securities fraud,1 
and § 32(a) of the 1934 Act criminalizes the willful violation of "any 
provision of this chapter, or any rule or regulation thereunder,"2 
including § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
In 2002, in the wake of the collapses of WorldCom and Enron, 
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.3 Section 807 of the Act, 
codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1348, created a new crime called "Securities 
fraud." Section 1348 defines this crime as follows: 
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or arti­
fice— 
(1) to defraud any person in connection with . . . any security of [a 
reporting]4 issuer . . .; or 
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representa­
tions, or promises, any money or property in connection with the 
purchase or sale of . . . any security of [a reporting] issuer; shall be 
fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both. 
Section 1348 was slow to catch on. According to the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, only 45 defendants were charged with violating 
S1348 from 2002 through 2010.5 By contrast, during this same period, 
3 defendants were charged with violating § 10(b).6 
Recently, however, several courts have interpreted § 1348 s e e 
ments as diverging from § 10(b) in several respects, leading 0 ar 
Journal articles with titles like "Insider Trading Charges Under bee-
•on 1348-Without the 'Technical Elements?'"" and "The Evolving 
ystery of Illegal Insider Trading."9 
.1 though these recent court decisions are sending shoe waves 
rough the legal community, the provision's author, Senator 
^e%, was not bashful about his intention to create a new se£urit^ 
aud crime that is easier to prove than § 10(b). In particular, en 
ea y explained the new crime of securities fraud as follows. 
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o "the term 'false statement' does not imply a materiality 
because the^r ^ Mfalse statement" and 'fraudulent 
requiremen . alternatiVe, there is no presumption that material-
stateme because conviction can be premised on mere falsity. 
ity is anieo48(2) does just this, allowing for conviction based on "false 
^SdulMt P^nses, representations, or promises." Therefore 
arguably, convfction under § 1348(2) does not require a showing of 
mSection^l348 was not enacted in a vacuum, however. In fact, the 
textof§1348 mirrors the text of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344, which profits 
bank fraud.17 The bank fraud statute, in turn, was modeled on the 
mail and wire fraud statutes.18 Therefore, the caselaw construingthe 
mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes should guide the interpretation ot 
§ 1348.19 In Neder v. United States, the Supreme Court—albeh without 
examining the grammar of the bank fraud statute in detai e 
the crimes of mail, wire, and bank fraud include the e emen o 
materiality.20 Therefore, Congress, by later choosing to enact identical 
language in § 1348,21 is presumed to have incorporated this settle in­
terpretation of the statutory text.22 Moreover, the title ot § , , 
which was enacted by Congress as positive law2 and which she s 
light on proper interpretation of the section's text24 labels the crime 
"securities fraud," confirming that Congress intended to incorporate 
the common law fraud element of materiality into the crime, r' ina y, 
to the extent there were any ambiguity, the rule of lenity wou avor 
the narrower interpretation of this criminal statute, punishing on y 
material" misrepresentations under § 1348.25 
The next question is how materiality is defined under § 134 . n 
«er, while holding that the mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes 
incorporate the common law element of materiality, the oupreme 
ourt quoted with approval two definitions of materiality. Furs , e 
fourt quoted the following definition from United States v. Gaudin: 
In general, a false statement is material if it has 'a natural tendency 
\° !nfIuence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision ot the 
decisionmaking body to which it was addressed."26 Second, the Court 
^ted the following Restatement (Second) of Torts definition of 
materiality: 
(a) [A] reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or 
onexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in 
question; or 
th(b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know 
inj t replplent regards or is likely to regard the matter as impor an 
nm 6 ermining his choice of action, although a reasonable man wou 
not so regard it.27 
Slfthough a few courts have adopted the Restatement definitioni in 
equent mail and wire fraud cases, most courts apply the Gaudin 
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«i oral theory" of insider trading applies to corporate insiders— 
the classical ydirectors and temporary insiders such as an un-^hasoiBcersandd'rectors anaor working for the 
derwnter mm ^ ^ ̂  ̂  g fiduciary relationship with 
r^Tny-s Shareholders, must either disclose the inside informa-
tnor abstain from trading in the company's securities on the basis 
, r 37 cpconci the "misappropriation theory" of insider trading i 
impKcateif when' a person "misappropriates confidential information 
for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the^sourc 
of the information."1' Under this theory, the 
recipient and the source of the information gives rise to a duty on the 
part of the recipient either to abstain from trading on the information 
or to disclose his or her plans to trade to the source of the information^ 
Finally, a "tippee" of an insider or a misappropriator is subject^to 
§10(b)'s insider trading prohibitions if the tipper breac es a 
duty by disclosing the information to the tippee and i ^ PP 
knows or has reason to know that the disclosure is a breac . ® , 
the tipper's disclosure constitutes a breach of fiduciary du y p 
on whether the tipper "personally will benefit, directly or in l 
from his disclosure."41 . 
Section 10(b) currently imposes liability under the classica J* 
only if the inside information satisfies the investor-orien e o J ^ 
materiality standard that applies in misrepresentation , 
other words, under the classical theory, if a reasonable inves . , 
not find the inside information to be significant in making a 
ment decision, trading on the basis of that information oes n0 
§ 10(b). The applicable definition of materiality under e mi 
priation theory is less settled, with several courts and com 
musing that materiality should be linked to the source 
information.43 Most courts and commentators, however, ap . 
same investor-oriented materiality standard in all insi e 44 
contexts, including cases premised on the misappropna ion 
2. Section 1348,s Subjective and/or Source-Oriented 
Materiality Standards 
This author has identified three distinct theories of i^Lj^one 
liability under § 1348, each with its own materiality standair • 
these theories applies the objective, investor-orien under 
f?*dard that is ordinarily applied in insider tradl"S '®®tentially 
§ t0(b). As a consequence, the materiality standar 1 P 
ower in § 1348 prosecutions than in prosecutions premi 
hons of § 10(b). 
First, conduct that would fall within the classical, 
°n> or tipping theories under § 10(b)'s prohibition on 
81 
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finest services fraud. For example, if an employee shares 
^/^Information about his or her employer with a third party, 
•1 tin of the employee's duties to the employer and in exchange 
[VOL 
for 
hire of the profits derived from trading, this is arguably akin to 
The paid by the third party to the employee in order for the em-
Wee to violate his or her duties.53 The materiality standard that ap-
Es in the context of honest services fraud is whether the recipient of 
the duty of honest services—usually, the employer—would have 
tended to change its conduct if the employee had disclosed his or her 
secret dealings in violation of the duty.54 Therefore, like the intangible 
property fraud discussed above, the materiality analysis for honest 
services securities fraud is source-based, not investor-hased 
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the dangers of setting the 
hand, as the SuPJ'^ , DUblicity "60 This consideration weighs in favor 
markets without 1PaUteriahty-both to lower the bar for squired 
of a lower standard[ of mat^ai^y ^ statements. 0n the other hand, 
disclosures and to deter a ^ dangers. When applied to omis-
an unduly low standard ca t dard might bring an overabundance 
sions by a company, a minimal st^^Janagem%nt 'simply to bury 
of information within it > information—a result that is 
the shareholders in an avalanch , „69 Moreover, when ap-
hardly conducive to informed materiality standard 
plied to affirmative misrepresentations the f SEC fil. 
prevents "every miniscule inaccuracy in public^steteme yolun. 
ings" from being actionable, thus encouraging P 70 
tarily without fear of inadvertently incurring liability. 
A subjective materiality standard disrupts this de^Cpf^P^maWng 
Companies and management will logically think twice mpn+ary 
my voluntary disclosures, for fear than even innocuous /~.nnPTess 
:ould be characterized as "capable of influencing inves or • . 
las previously recognized the importance of voluntary isc 
;he context of forward-looking statements by enacting a s a . 
larborfrom civil liability,71 with the goal of making more in „72 
ibout a company's future plans available to investors an e p ' 
fbe safe harbor does not apply in criminal cases, so orwa 
statements are among the types of statements that rnay e 
i consequence of this potentially lower materiality standar . 
It is worth noting that one factor counteracts the ntia y <•* 
n g  i m p a c t  o f  §  1 3 4 8 ' s  l o w e r  m a t e r i a l i t y  s t a n d a r d :  §  1 3 4 8  o n l y  P P .  _
® fraud in connection with the securities of reporting issue * , 73 
ng issuers are subject to an extensive mandatory repo ing 
0 the potential chilling effect is lessened somewhat. 
2. Chilling of Legitimate Uses of Information 
In the insider trading context, the lower materiality stan ar 
e reIated uncertainty about the applicable materia 1 y u_ 
nf.y lnfribit legitimate uses of information, such as engagi g 
es analysis or leading a company into v a l u e -enhancing 
factions. 
Section 1348's materiality standards may chill securities ana ys ̂  
ns interfering with the important function trecognized, 
-nsunng market efficiency. As the Supreme Court kas S 
^ket efficiency is "significantly enhanced by [analysts ] 
e and analyze information, and thus th e small 
founds to the benefit of all investors."74 Anaiysts compile sma 
*ces of information from a variety of sources in order to reachcon^iu 
^ about the covered companies. As Professor Donna M. Nagy kas 
flamed, "[B]oth courts and the SEC have acknowledged that 
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»%£d2sr>. -«• x 
VaS3K55^^?^ 8ut this rulp r na^ysts to fill jn +u_ «• , ruJe> with a purported 
Wa|eCision PreventPs°Sed by the S E C 1 i, .'" Stices in analysis":" 
Jaga requi ^tspartie® from q lis inherently imprecise, and 
neUr 18 beCn p""mSS tbe Parties havge sZ, "T » a« 
mThereforei § j ; be sure wh™ the line is 
^ S , ! S s e c u r i t r " V e , a n d  ® o u r c e " O r i e n t e d  
8**®XL 1348'S va ' markets. GS ana^ysis, interfering with 
arluS^ctionsg Pro^: ma^ with the uncertaint! 
dard!* obieot^ J°an MacLeod £ *ng effect on business 
°f in § l0(,lve "reasonable , enJlnway has convincingly 
She ar^PGr balance «i! Cases is often areholder" materiality stan-
becausp11? ^at this eeJ acc°untinp- n<~Jear> such as in the contexts 
°ffer^ngs°g''baregone mer^ *™s" 
outside rn stock rP enbancintr f a facts shareholder value 
that addiSl fees andPd-rkhases)> maIanSaCti°ns (including issuer 
article, she ^ materiahtvburs^enTs -oafmGnt factions, and 
^ateriality the m ^dance is n ,a solution, she contends | 
£ed by Profe^da?Ce-82 SeS®ans> content eed®d; and in a follow-up 
inonl Pursuing vai minWav°T 1348 exao'p^ form of this proposed 
by th ^asonab^ ^bancinJ1 Particular *th ? fc^e Pr°blem identi-
darri 6 ?oteutial tff f arebold activfties bv +u 6 lns*der who is chilled 
the! might applv ? a.subjenfT ^ndLT Certainty surround-
are o^^^uly surrlmdarly th^-?1* s°urce be even more rattled 
source!nrJle^ ene^bvnf,?dn^ the n>,t8bractimiR^eC1'?C materiality stan-
Rented standi j uricer* ^ective in and ^ees in the face of 
* . balance B ^ ^ sU^or-oriented standard 
lO Ux\°n 1348 is on! Ween civii g the subJective °r 
•" SS-S'S 86 _ th civiijv lnal]v , lability 
e201^omSo„R6uters % y 10(b) and Rule 
CUritiesc> Section 1348 s 
Nation La 
W J°Urnal • Spring 2013 
CRIMINAL SECURITIES FRAUD & THE MATERIALITY STANDARD 
[VOL. 41:1 zuijj 
, • 1Uv standard operates to make some misrepresentations 
lower material y trading actionable criminally but not civilly (even if 
9u Sional civil elements of reliance and damages are met). As 
tj? addition ^ iously argued in the context of mail and wire 
fraud3,"this upsets the ordinary relationship between criminal and 
C1 Iflriminal^liability is ordinarily a subset of civil liability in instances 
where the relevant conduct injures identifiable individuals. Some civilly 
actionable conduct is so wrongful that it is also acnme. If criminal 
conduct involves a mens rea and an identifiable victim, the conduct is 
usually also civilly actionable. This relationship between civil and crimi­
nal liability is supported by the general rationale that cnmmal sanctions 
are more severe than civil liability.84 
This ordinary relationship between criminal and civil liability is 
supported by two general theories: an economic theory and a mora 
theory. Under economic theory, "criminal liability [which has a hig er 
social cost than civil liability] is only optimal when the damages nec­
essary to limit the offender's conduct to an optimal level are higher 
than the actor could pay."85 Under moral theory, only that subset of 
civilly actionable "conduct that is morally repugnant should be classi­
fied as a crime."86 
The extension of the scope of criminal liability under § 1348 beyond 
the scope of civil liability under § 10(b) seems to turn this ordinary 
understanding on its head, contrary to the leading theories about t e 
civil-criminal divide. As this author has previously postulated, 
however, there is one potential explanation for this inversion in t e 
context of securities fraud, with potential support in the economic the­
ory of the civil-criminal divide. Perhaps, in the unique context of secu­
res fraud, the social cost of civil liability—with the disproportiona e 
effect on the defendant company's stock value, the spillover effects on 
he securities markets and the overall economy, and the immense 
consumption of judicial resources—actually exceeds the social cos o 
cnmmal liability, thus explaining why the relationship between civil 
n criminal liability is inverted in the context of securities frau 
C. Undue Prosecutorial Discretion 
Section 1348, like other broad fraud statutes, affords the prosecu-
WjfL I?me*dous discretion in assessing what conduct to prosecu e. 
bern }1S, discreti°n comes a danger that enforcement decisions will 
m n h , a ^  a s e ( *  o n  i m p r o p e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  s u c h  a s  b i a s  o r  p o i  
PowJ 9 Moreover, this broad discretion implicates separation of 
so,mJS concerns because, by in effect criminalizing everything 
nding ln securities fraud and leaving it to the prosecutors to decide 
the PV° pr?secute> Congress has delegated the law-making func I 
executive branch.90 Although these concerns probably do not rise 
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n nf fraud ordinarily shoul Coptinns between individuals, 
civil or criminal litigation in the 
w98 i 
state courts. , statutes § 1348 is narrowly 
In contrast to the mai an_ ^ • securities fraud, with far less 
tailored to apply to conduct^sounding in ^ thg mail and wira 
potential to "metastasize. The arg tion» when the charged 
fraud statutes should be reP®^® SDecific fraud statute is inapplicable 
conduct falls within the scope of a specihc characterize 
because § 1348 is specific.™ in securities fraud 
the usage of § 1348 to prosecute induct scmndin:g torg are 
as a "run-around," with ^negative potation tha^p standarda.«, 
using a loophole to avoid Congres s security constrained by the 
Therefore, prosecutors are less likely ute misrepresenta-
potential for push-back when using § I®4® c0nsider important or to 
tions that a reasonable investor would not satisfy the 
prosecute trading on inside information tha ^ to prQse. 
objective, investor-oriented materiality stf^ ' Jer the untested 
cute the defendants in United States v. Maimore predict-
§1348 criminal securities fraud statute, iraS^JthPsis that prosecutors 
able wire or mail fraud statutes, supports this underline conduct 
are less likely to feel squeamish about charging tes 
under § 1348 than under the mail and wire frau While the 
Therefore, this essay argues that § 1348 does ma ® g^ility that 
"mail/wire fraud run- around" presents the tb^efrcal ?ngide 
mmatenal misrepresentations or trading base makes this 
information might be prosecuted, the availability of § 134» ma 
prosecution more likely to occur. 
Conclusion , ,iarci than 
section 1348 probably imposes a lower Materiality 
Xb). With respect to misrepresentations, a s J misrepre-
ndard likely applies, which inquires whether with respect to 
tation is "capable of influencing" an • rdg appiy. With 
der trading, several potential materiality „ioS<=ical misappro-
pect to conduct falling within the tradition subiective stan-
*tion, or tipping theories, § 1348 likely ^ * ation js "capable of 
d, again looking at whether the inside in falling within 
uencing" an investor. With respect to co materiality 
ingible property fraud or honest services standard to a 
ndard probably shifts from an investor-omnte^ -tan^ ̂  
'rce-oriented standard. Under this sour have changed its 
as of the inquiry is whether the source would .have^n 
duct had it known about its confidante s si e 
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to prosecutors in Ha -Ir86 swat^e of conduct—affnrH standard-
sr&S*is 
«• •••'>«.«»S STm,bL"* •' 
use of 8 IQ40 " ause of the Conere^i^ 1 * imposes a mar-
Therefn prosecute conduct^,„nrT mp °f approval on tke 
essav q Unless courts int7 S°"fdlnf? m securities fraud. 
pXSft - ̂ ely or CoZJ§1348 more na—>y than this 
dard under 8^ Wary of the nnf aaiands the statute, market 
whether som Courts, when inb l y Iower materiality stan-
hmited interpret ? e concems raised^ ^ 1348' should consider 
mail wire »t5, 011 °f § 1348 ^ -ln essay compel a more 
ing § i348's mimicking of the 
purities analysis 1?centives to enm Congress, when consider-
impacts of criminT corP°rate tranc"*^6 VoIuntary disclosure, se-
over even the most statutes like 8 i o!o ,8' should remember the 
most carefully 1348, which can run roughshod 
XT 1Vl regulatory scheme. 
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